Comments on: Game Theory and Military Planning http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/ ...explorations in complex adaptive systems... Thu, 09 Sep 2010 12:29:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: danielhorowitz http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11943 danielhorowitz Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:22:56 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11943 Hi Tony - My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the "game" is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to "real life." Hi Tony -

My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the “game” is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to “real life.”

]]> By: Tony-S http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11785 Tony-S Thu, 22 Apr 2010 16:32:54 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11785 I don't see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me. That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis: - The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid, - the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare) - the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay. - The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators - etc... I don’t see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me.

That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis:
- The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid,
- the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare)
- the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay.
- The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators
- etc…

]]> By: DennisP http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-5728 DennisP Sat, 12 Dec 2009 18:35:45 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-5728 Are you sure you're looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the "cooperation" strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a "public benefit" to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want. Also, you mention "if the Taliban is defeated or cleared," but don't mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely. It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms. Are you sure you’re looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the “cooperation” strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a “public benefit” to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want.

Also, you mention “if the Taliban is defeated or cleared,” but don’t mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely.

It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms.

]]> By: kevindick http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/ ...explorations in complex adaptive systems... Thu, 09 Sep 2010 12:29:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 Comments on: Game Theory and Military Planning http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/ ...explorations in complex adaptive systems... Thu, 09 Sep 2010 12:29:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: danielhorowitz http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11943 danielhorowitz Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:22:56 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11943 Hi Tony - My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the "game" is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to "real life." Hi Tony -

My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the “game” is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to “real life.”

]]> By: Tony-S http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11785 Tony-S Thu, 22 Apr 2010 16:32:54 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11785 I don't see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me. That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis: - The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid, - the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare) - the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay. - The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators - etc... I don’t see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me.

That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis:
- The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid,
- the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare)
- the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay.
- The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators
- etc…

]]> By: DennisP http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-5728 DennisP Sat, 12 Dec 2009 18:35:45 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-5728 Are you sure you're looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the "cooperation" strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a "public benefit" to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want. Also, you mention "if the Taliban is defeated or cleared," but don't mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely. It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms. Are you sure you’re looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the “cooperation” strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a “public benefit” to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want.

Also, you mention “if the Taliban is defeated or cleared,” but don’t mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely.

It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms.

]]> By: kevindick http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11943 danielhorowitz Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:22:56 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11943 Hi Tony - My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the "game" is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to "real life." Hi Tony -

My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the “game” is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to “real life.”

]]> Comments on: Game Theory and Military Planning http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/ ...explorations in complex adaptive systems... Thu, 09 Sep 2010 12:29:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: danielhorowitz http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11943 danielhorowitz Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:22:56 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11943 Hi Tony - My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the "game" is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to "real life." Hi Tony -

My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the “game” is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to “real life.”

]]> By: Tony-S http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11785 Tony-S Thu, 22 Apr 2010 16:32:54 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11785 I don't see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me. That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis: - The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid, - the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare) - the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay. - The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators - etc... I don’t see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me.

That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis:
- The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid,
- the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare)
- the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay.
- The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators
- etc…

]]> By: DennisP http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-5728 DennisP Sat, 12 Dec 2009 18:35:45 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-5728 Are you sure you're looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the "cooperation" strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a "public benefit" to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want. Also, you mention "if the Taliban is defeated or cleared," but don't mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely. It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms. Are you sure you’re looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the “cooperation” strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a “public benefit” to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want.

Also, you mention “if the Taliban is defeated or cleared,” but don’t mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely.

It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms.

]]> By: kevindick http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11785 Tony-S Thu, 22 Apr 2010 16:32:54 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11785 I don't see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me. That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis: - The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid, - the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare) - the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay. - The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators - etc... I don’t see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me.

That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis:
- The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid,
- the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare)
- the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay.
- The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators
- etc…

]]> Comments on: Game Theory and Military Planning http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/ ...explorations in complex adaptive systems... Thu, 09 Sep 2010 12:29:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: danielhorowitz http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11943 danielhorowitz Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:22:56 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11943 Hi Tony - My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the "game" is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to "real life." Hi Tony -

My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the “game” is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to “real life.”

]]> By: Tony-S http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11785 Tony-S Thu, 22 Apr 2010 16:32:54 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11785 I don't see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me. That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis: - The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid, - the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare) - the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay. - The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators - etc... I don’t see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me.

That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis:
- The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid,
- the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare)
- the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay.
- The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators
- etc…

]]> By: DennisP http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-5728 DennisP Sat, 12 Dec 2009 18:35:45 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-5728 Are you sure you're looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the "cooperation" strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a "public benefit" to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want. Also, you mention "if the Taliban is defeated or cleared," but don't mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely. It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms. Are you sure you’re looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the “cooperation” strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a “public benefit” to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want.

Also, you mention “if the Taliban is defeated or cleared,” but don’t mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely.

It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms.

]]> By: kevindick http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-5728 DennisP Sat, 12 Dec 2009 18:35:45 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-5728 Are you sure you're looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the "cooperation" strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a "public benefit" to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want. Also, you mention "if the Taliban is defeated or cleared," but don't mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely. It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms. Are you sure you’re looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the “cooperation” strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a “public benefit” to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want.

Also, you mention “if the Taliban is defeated or cleared,” but don’t mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely.

It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms.

]]> Comments on: Game Theory and Military Planning http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/ ...explorations in complex adaptive systems... Thu, 09 Sep 2010 12:29:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: danielhorowitz http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11943 danielhorowitz Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:22:56 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11943 Hi Tony - My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the "game" is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to "real life." Hi Tony -

My analysis is based on the payoff matrix provided in the paper. You are correct that the “game” is actually far more complex than the simplified payoff matrix I am using, and thus my conclusions are not applicable to “real life.”

]]> By: Tony-S http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-11785 Tony-S Thu, 22 Apr 2010 16:32:54 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-11785 I don't see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me. That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis: - The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid, - the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare) - the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay. - The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators - etc... I don’t see how you can infer that in a multiple round game, Afghan villagers would see cooperation with the coalition as the best strategy. Seems more like wishful thinking to me.

That would be probably because you left out so many important elements in your analysis:
- The general hostility of Afghan civilians towards foreign troops, no matter the amount of aid,
- the fact that Talibans can be cleared off a region only on a short-term basis (basis of guerrilla warfare)
- the fact that allegiances are temporary, favors the ones that are likely to be more permanent. The coalition will leave one day. The Talibans are there to stay.
- The differences in the price paid for allegiance to the wrong side. Talibans have apparently no problem cutting away fingers and hands of collaborators
- etc…

]]> By: DennisP http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-5728 DennisP Sat, 12 Dec 2009 18:35:45 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-5728 Are you sure you're looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the "cooperation" strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a "public benefit" to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want. Also, you mention "if the Taliban is defeated or cleared," but don't mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely. It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms. Are you sure you’re looking at this in an unbiased way? A Taliban game theorist might say that supporting the Taliban is the “cooperation” strategy. The paper mentions that supporting the Coalition brings a “public benefit” to both villages, but that assumes that Coalition victory is what villagers actually want.

Also, you mention “if the Taliban is defeated or cleared,” but don’t mention the possibility that Coalition forces may run out of patience/political support/money and leave the country. Given the history of Afghanistan (vs. the Soviets and the British), and of the U.S. (Vietnam), this is not all that unlikely.

It appears to me that the situation is symmetrical, and neither side can be said to have a clear advantage in game-theoretic terms.

]]> By: kevindick http://emergentfool.com/2009/05/03/game-theory-and-military-planning/#comment-2033 kevindick Mon, 04 May 2009 18:17:35 +0000 http://emergentfool.com/?p=1503#comment-2033 This is a very good point. To take it further, we might be better off focusing our efforts on "priming" the villager to think in terms of repeated interaction than changing the one-shot payoff matrix. This would include things like making regular visits to the village where our forces provide modest, but highly visible rewards for cooperation in that round. We should also make a highly visible commitment to keeping our forces there for a significant period of time. Of course, if we don't think there's anything we can do to get the villagers to think we'll be around and consistent enough to treat this as a repeated game, then this won't work. This is a very good point. To take it further, we might be better off focusing our efforts on “priming” the villager to think in terms of repeated interaction than changing the one-shot payoff matrix.

This would include things like making regular visits to the village where our forces provide modest, but highly visible rewards for cooperation in that round. We should also make a highly visible commitment to keeping our forces there for a significant period of time.

Of course, if we don’t think there’s anything we can do to get the villagers to think we’ll be around and consistent enough to treat this as a repeated game, then this won’t work.

]]>