Quantum Reality and the Measurement Paradox

I may be primarily an evolutionary theorist nowadays, but I have many interests, and this summer is proving to be a good time to explore some areas not directly connected to my need to publish. Lately I’ve been doing some reading on quantum mechanics, and what it tells us about reality.

QM is astonishing in both its mathematical elegance and its fundamental counter-intuitiveness. Unfortunately, I think many (including mathematicians) are discouraged from learning about quantum because it is typically presented assuming a deep knowledge of classical mechanics. But in my view, QM isn’t just a theory about physics. It’s a theory about reality and truth, and many of its implications can be understood with no knowledge of physics at all.

The essential feature of quantum reality, and what makes it different from the way we naturally think, is the superposition principle. It says that if A and B are two possible states of something (a photon, a cat, the whole world…), these states can be added to get another possible state, A+B. For example, if a light switch can exist in ON and OFF positions, there must also be a possible state ON+OFF. Subtraction works too: the state ON-OFF must is a valid state as well. To my mathematician friends: we are moving from the set of possibilities {ON, OFF} to the two-dimensional vector space generated by the basis vectors ON and OFF.

It’s important to delineate what is not happening here. ON+OFF does not mean that the switch is stuck somewhere between on and off. It also does not mean that it might be either on or off and we just don’t know which. ON+OFF is a fully-determined state which is neither ON nor OFF, but a superposition of the two.

Of course, no one has ever observed a light switch being ON+OFF. Something happens when we observe these superimposed states, such that we can only ever see the “classical” states ON or OFF.

In the standard (a.k.a. Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics, when a superimposed state is observed, it “collapses” into one of the classically observable states. In the case of ON+OFF, whenever we look at the switch, it collapses into either an ON or and OFF state, with equal probability. But until we look at it, in remains in the state ON+OFF, which has unique properties making it distinct from either the ON or OFF state.

This interpretation poses a host of logical difficulties. What exactly constitutes an “observation”, and how would a light switch “know” that it is being observed and should therefore jump into an observable state? Many of the best minds in physics believe that observation has something to do with consciousness, but this raises several obvious questions: How is consciousness is defined? What gives it this unique power to induce jumps in physical states?

I’ve recently come across a new interpretation, proposed in 1997 by Cerf and Adami. They suggest that superimposed states do not collapse when observed, but rather the observer becomes entangled with the observed, forming a larger superimposed state.

To illustrate this, let’s turn to Schrodinger’s cat paradox. An atom is prepared in a superposition of two states: one in which the atom will emit a photon and one in which it won’t. This atom is placed in a box with a cat and an apparatus which will release poisonous gas if the photon is emitted (the details of the setup are unimportant). According to the Copenhagen interpretation, the system exists in the superimposed state

(EMIT and DEAD_CAT)+(NOT_EMIT and ALIVE_CAT)

until such point as the box is opened by a conscious observer, whereupon the system “collapses” and the cat becomes either just alive or just dead. (This raises some questions of whether cats count as conscious, but such objections only deepen the underlying paradox).

In the Cerf and Adami interpretation, there is no collapse, only entanglement. When we observe the contents of the box, we ourselves become entangled with this system. We become part of the resulting superimposed state:

(EMIT and DEAD_CAT and WE_SEE_DEAD_CAT)
+ (NOT_EMIT and ALIVE_CAT and WE_SEE_ALIVE_CAT)

Of course, we still only see the cat as being either dead or alive, not both. But according to Cerf and Adami, this is only because the state EMIT+NOT_EMIT of the atom is unobservable to us. Of the full superimposed state, we can only see the parts pertaining to the cat and to the observer. Observing only part of the system, it appears to us that the cat is either alive or dead. Anyone else observing the cat would see it to be in the same state that we do, but this is only because the second observer is just as entangled as we are. The cat is still superimposed between alive and dead, and if we could see the whole system, we’d realize that we ourselves are superimposed between seeing it alive and seeing it dead.

From a mathematical point of view, Cerf and Adami’s proposal neatly resolves the paradox of observation and state collapse. However, it raises far more troubling questions of its own, which the authors do not begin to explore.

Think of a decision you made today. It’s not unreasonable to think that there are quantum processes in our brain whose outcomes affect our decisions (this view is advanced by my friend Bob Doyle). Let’s say that there was a certain quantum state in your brain whose collapse into one of two states (in the Copenhagen interpretation) tilted your decision one way or the other.

If this is true, then in Cerf and Adami’s interpretation, we actually exist in a superposition of realities: one in which your decision went one way and one in which it went the other. You can only see one of these realities, and everyone you’ve encountered since has become entangled with you and therefore sees the same reality that you do. But the alternate reality is playing itself out, Sliding Doors-style, superimposed on top of our own.

Furthermore, due to quantum interference, any actions taken in this reality can affect any of the superimposed other realities. And conversely, anything your alternate-reality twin does in his or her reality can affect the reality you and I see.

I tend to believe Cerf and Adami’s idea, because millenia of physics research have shown us that the mathematically elegant solution is usually the right one. But this means our universe is weirder than we can possibly imagine.

Related posts:

  1. Universal Constants

  • alexgolubev

    Plektix, I really like this: “superimposed states do not collapse when observed, but rather the observer becomes entangled with the observed, forming a larger superimposed state.”

    1. This is precisely how I go about thinking about the Monty Hall three door gameshow “problem”, where after picking a door its somehow considered better to switch after the host reveals another door with nothing behind it. Just ask yourself about the other real or imaginary Host and or other contestants that are or could be playing along and picking other doors. Conditional probability – yes, but conditional on whose choices?

    2. The observer becomes entangled with the observed. McLuhan's underlying theory is that all our technologies are extensions of our senses and mind, we are just too “narc'd” to notice: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcissus_(mytholo...

    “Sliding Doors” was a great movie. It's the “Primer” of romantic comedies :)

  • kevinsdick

    @alexgolubev

    I don't understand why you think the Monty Hall Problem has anything to do with QM. The Host is giving you information by opening a door, which as a good Bayesian, you update on. If you have a uniform prior on which door hides the prize, you will switch. This is a simple consequence of Bayes' Rule.

    It's the fact that the Host gives you new information that causes the change in your choice. Thinking about superposed initial door choices doesn't change this at all.

    @plektix

    This is pretty much the many world's interpretation, but from the point of view of the universal wavefunction as opposed to any particular observer. From the observer's standpoint, versions of him are now in two separate blobs of amplitude in the universal wavefunction–the worlds have “split”.

  • Alex Golubev

    Kevin, I definitely could be misunderstanding the problem. Alex and Kevin are playing the game. Alex picks door 1, Kevin picks door 2. The host reveals that door 3 has a goat and offers Alex and Kevin a chance to switch. Are you suggesting that we both switch?

  • kevinsdick

    No. Because our making different choices in the same blob of amplitude changes the information the Host can give us.

    The reason you switch in the single player game is because the Host _must_ show a goat. However, with two simultaneous players, it is possible that you and I could both pick goats, leaving the Host with no choice but to show the car. So it's really not the same game at all.

    Now, in the superposed version of the game where Kevin decoheres, leading to Kevin1 and Kevin2 choosing different doors, both Kevins should switch. But this is because Host1 and Host2 provide them different information.

  • alexgolubev

    If we ALWAYS already know that the host is going to reveal a goat, then it's really a two door game to begin with because the always-goat-door can NEVER be picked. am i getting there? :)

  • kevinsdick

    Actually, I think you're getting farther away. It's not fundamentally a two-door game. There's no “always-goat-door”. The car can be behind any door. There are two goats and the player can only pick one door, so there will always be at least one goat that the Host can show.

    The reason the MHP confuses people is because the Host's choices are dynamic based on the Player's move in the game and the Host has more information than the Player.

  • Alex Golubev

    Let's go back to the original speculation about using 2 players with your suggestion of having 2 hosts to even be able to play the game. If both players should switch, then what probabilities does Kevin3 (the Bookie) place on the 2 remaining doors or Kevins? Are you suggesting that by switching both Kevins achieve a 2/3 chance of winning each?

  • kevinsdick

    Let's not call him Kevin3. Let's call him the Bookie. Prospectively, the Bookie will always be willing to offer 2:1 odds (ignoring the spread ) that Kevin will win the car in the MHP because he knows Kevin plays the optimal strategy of switching.

    When Kevin decoheres, Bookie1 is still willing to offer 2:1 odds on Kevin1 and Bookie2 is still willing to offer 2:1 on Kevin2. Even if Kevin1 and Kevin2 have chosen different doors. But neither Bookie1 and Bookie2 can know that.

    The whole point of this interpretation is that decoherence prevents the blobs of amplitude from interacting. Therefore, no Bookie can gather information from both blobs and use it for arbitrage.

    Lots of very smart people have tried to show that switching is silly in the MHP and they have failed. I am willing to play 100 games of MHP (with a trusted third party as the Host) and bet $150 against your $100 each game that I win the “car”. But you better have $1667 to lose.

  • Alex Golubev

    Since it's father's day after all. My dad told me a long time ago that in every bet there's a liar and a fool, yet somehow I ended up in finance. I know that you're probably correct, not that you're a liar :). This is all just mental exercise.

    I think the simplest argument to “switch” that I've seen is imagining 1,000,000 doors. The player picks one door and then the host opens 999,998 goat doors. So we have a choice between 1/1,000,000 and almost absolute certainty. There's something to extremism :)

    Of course, the question then becomes – what probability do we approach on the last switch as we start with more and more doors and open/switch one at a time. I might have messed up again, but i think it approaches 63.212055…% not that it matters for MHP. I wonder if there's anything to that ratio

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